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against explanatory Minimalism in 
psychiatry
Tim Thornton*
College of Health and Wellbeing, University of Central Lancashire, Preston, UK
The idea that psychiatry contains, in principle, a series of levels of explanation has been 
criticized not only as empirically false but also, by Campbell, as unintelligible because it 
presupposes a discredited pre-Humean view of causation. Campbell’s criticism is based 
on an interventionist-inspired denial that mechanisms and rational connections underpin 
physical and mental causation, respectively, and hence underpin levels of explanation. 
These claims echo some superficially similar remarks in Wittgenstein’s Zettel. But atten-
tion to the context of Wittgenstein’s remarks suggests a reason to reject explanatory 
minimalism in psychiatry and reinstate a Wittgensteinian notion of levels of explanation. 
Only in a context broader than the one provided by interventionism is that the ascription 
of propositional attitudes, even in the puzzling case of delusions, justified. Such a view, 
informed by Wittgenstein, can reconcile the idea that the ascription mental phenomena 
presupposes a particular level of explanation with the rejection of an a priori claim about 
its connection to a neurological level of explanation.
Keywords: Campbell, levels of explanation, intentionality, mechanism, rationality, Wittgenstein
introdUCtion
Psychiatry deals with phenomena that range between large-scale higher order social phenomena 
(e.g., poverty, cultural norms), person level phenomena (e.g., trauma, symptoms such as delusions 
and syndromes such as depression), and the sub-personal level phenomena (e.g., genes, neurones). It 
advances explanations that invoke a variety of factors across the scale and both proximal and distal. 
It is tempting to think that this apparent heterogeneity could be simplified, in principle at least, 
by fitting it into a picture of different levels of explanation – whether ontological or epistemologi-
cal – which relate together in some general ways.
The actual applicability of this picture to present psychiatry has been contested (1). Typically, 
psychiatry trades across levels. This paper, however, describes a principled attack on the very idea of 
levels of explanation in favor of a form of explanatory minimalism. Put roughly, causal explanation 
can trade across putative levels because causation is brute and answers to no a priori conditions 
of intelligibility. That being so, the very idea of a “level of explanation” – which depends on such 
a priori assumptions about intelligibility – is undermined. Or so John Campbell argues in a number 
of papers (2–4).
Having set out Campbell’s argument for explanatory minimalism for psychiatry, I compare 
it to some similar sounding remarks from Wittgenstein’s collection Zettel (5). Like Campbell, 
Wittgenstein denies the necessity for mechanisms to mediate (apparently) causal connections and 
also denies the assumption that rational connections between mental phenomena need be medi-
ated by underlying neurological mechanisms. But Wittgenstein’s remarks are aimed at undermin-
ing mechanistic accounts of the intentional directedness of mental states, not at denying that there 
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is a characteristic level of explanation for mental phenomena. 
The problem lies not with the idea of levels of explanation but 
with an unwarranted metaphysical assumption about how they 
relate.
The final section builds on Wittgenstein’s account of the nor-
mative connections between mental phenomena and argues that 
Campbell’s explanatory minimalism is insufficient for psychiatry 
because it provides no account of what constitutes states as mental 
states, which plays an important role in psychiatric explanation.
BaCKGroUnd: LeVeLs oF 
eXpLanation
There are two dominant approaches to the idea of levels of expla-
nation: ontological and epistemological. Both attempt to shed 
light on the idea of levels of explanation by characterizing the 
differences between the levels and also the constraining relations 
between them.
The ontological view is part of a traditional reductionist pic-
ture of the world. On this picture, sciences of the mind, such as 
psychiatry and psychology, can in principle be reduced to biology 
(which might be construed as physiology or evolutionary biol-
ogy), biology to chemistry, and chemistry to physics. Oppenheim 
and Putnam expressed this view in their classic 1958 paper “Unity 
of science as working hypothesis.”
It is not absurd to suppose that psychological laws may 
eventually be explained in terms of the behaviour of 
individual neurons in the brain; that the behaviour of 
individual cells – including neurons – may eventually 
be explained in terms of their biochemical constitu-
tion; and that the behaviour of molecules –  including 
the macromolecules that make up living cells  –  may 
eventually be explained in terms of atomic physics. If 
this is achieved, then psychological laws will have, in 
principle, been reduced to laws of atomic physics… 
[Ref. (6): p. 407]
Oppenheim and Putnam go on to argue that the unity of 
science is served by “microreductions.” These are reductions in 
which:
The objects in the universe of discourse of [the 
reduced science or theory] are wholes which possess 
a decomposition into proper parts all of which belong 
to the universe of discourse of [the reducing science or 
theory] [ibid: 407].
In fact, they argue more strongly that microreduction is the 
only method seriously available for the unity of science [ibid: 
408]. They then go on to explore the consequences of this view 
by examining the preconditions for successfully attaining unity 
via microreduction. Since microreduction is construed as the 
only serious possibility for the unity of science, and since its suc-
cess rests on a number of other things being the case, the goal of 
unification has a number of presuppositions:
1. There must be several levels.
2. The number of levels must be finite.
3. There must be a unique lowest level …
4. Anything of any level except the lowest must possess 
a decomposition into things belonging to the next 
lowest level … [ibid: 409].
This list suggests the following view of nature and the constrain-
ing relations between levels of explanation. The world is made up 
of basic building blocks or atoms, which display regularities that 
can be described in the law statements of the most basic science. 
The basic atoms also combine to form larger structures that 
display characteristic regularities of their own. These can in turn 
be codified in the law statements of higher level sciences. But the 
higher level regularities do not emerge out of nothing. They can 
be explained as the consequences of the more basic patterns of 
behavior of atoms. So, the structure of the world and the structure 
of science can be seen as two isomorphic hierarchies of levels.
The picture suggests three interrelated mutually reinforcing 
views of the levels of explanation. First, they correspond to dif-
ferent disciplines within science. Second, higher levels contain 
objects that are constituted from lower level objects. Third, higher 
level objects are larger than lower level objects. These views fit 
together on the assumptions that different sciences study objects 
at different scales and that objects only interact with other objects 
at the same level. However, these assumptions have been criti-
cized (7).
There is, however, another and quite different approach to 
levels of explanation, which has been influential. It is based not 
on the size and composition but rather degree of abstraction to 
higher order causal processes. This is Marr’s threefold epistemo-
logical distinction between:
Computational theory: What is the goal of the computa-
tion, why is it appropriate, and what is the logic of the 
strategy by which it can be carried out?
Representation and algorithm: How can this computa-
tional theory be implemented? In particular, what is the 
representation for the input and output, and what is the 
algorithm for the transformation?
Hardware Implementation: How can the representation 
and algorithm be realized physically? [Ref. (8): p. 25]
This hierarchy does not concern different ontological levels 
but rather different ways of understanding the same ontology. The 
highest, most abstract level concerns the function of a system. It 
might be carried out by a variety of different algorithms at the 
middle level. Finally, the same algorithm might be realized in 
different physical ways at the lowest level. Thus, the higher levels 
are multiply realizable by lower levels. Determining the com-
putational level is a matter of determining the goals of a system 
independently of its physical or neurological properties.
Although Marr’s epistemic approach seems appropriate for 
its original application to vision, where the goals of the system 
can be theorized about independent of algorithm and physi-
ological realization, it is less clear that it applies to psychiatry. 
As Dominic Murphy argues, actual practice in psychiatry is 
December 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1713
Thornton Against Explanatory Minimalism in Psychiatry
Frontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org
to determine the functions of systems in part with a view 
of what the lower level physiology could sustain. “[O]ur 
understanding of realisation feeds back into and constrains 
our understanding of the abstract demands of cognition” [Ref. 
(1): p. 105].
Neither, however, does the ontological view of levels of 
explanation fit psychiatry because “causes described in genetic 
vocabulary will be related to effects described in terms of behav-
ioural tests, for example, and generalisations will cross levels” 
[ibid: 108]. Thus, according to Murphy, there are different systems 
operating at different levels, unlike the epistemic view, but the 
different levels interact, unlike the ontological view.
Murphy’s argument starts from a relaxed approach to the 
nature of levels – “I have little to say about what levels of explana-
tion actually are” [ibid: 103] – and then argues that they do not 
apply to psychiatry. Whatever they are, psychiatric explanation 
typically crosses them. Such an argument, however, leaves open 
the response that it merely reflects the current imperfect state of 
psychiatry. It is tempting to think that Oppenheim and Putnam’s 
picture reflects how reality must be structured even if, for con-
tingent reasons, causal generalizations can link different levels. 
Equally, the fact that knowledge of physical realization informs 
more abstract theories of function need not conflict with the idea 
that there are, in principle, different levels of abstraction applica-
ble to a completed psychiatry. These possibilities remain because 
Murphy’s arguments do not, explicitly at least, undermine the 
intelligibility of the concept of levels of explanation. By contrast, 
according to John Campbell, the very idea of a level of explana-
tion is a reflection of a mistaken pre-Humean view of causation. 
There is less to explanation than the requirement to fit a specific 
level would require.
CaMpBeLL’s CritiCisM oF LeVeLs oF 
eXpLanation in psyCHiatry
To characterize his target, Campbell gives the example of a 
discussion of thought insertion by Christopher Frith (9). Frith 
claims that whether or not inappropriate firings of dopamine 
neurons are found in subjects who experience thought insertion, 
this fact could not be used to explain their experiences. It would 
shed no light on why that kind of symptom, rather than another, 
was produced by inappropriate firings of dopamine neurons. To 
shed light, Frith assumes that we need an account pitched at a 
particular level: in Frith’s case that of a sub-personal but still cog-
nitive model of mechanisms supposedly responsible for thought 
insertion.
Campbell suggests that the assumption that there is a right 
level of explanation that clarifies things in the way Frith desires is 
the result of a pre-Humean view of causal explanation. Although 
often forgotten, Hume successfully argued that there need be no 
intelligible connection between cause and effect. That is implicit 
in his rejection of any logical connection to analyze the appar-
ently necessitating relation between cause and effect. Causal con-
nections are merely brute facts to be discovered by experience.
Resisting the idea that the right kind of cause and effect have to 
be intelligibly, rather than merely brutely related also undercuts 
the motivation for the levels of explanation picture on both 
approaches: ontological and epistemic.
We naturally seek a certain kind of intelligibility in 
nature; we naturally try to find explanations that will 
show the world to conform to reason, to behave as it 
ought. Hume’s point is that there are no such intelligi-
ble connections to be found. This point has generally 
been accepted by philosophers thinking about causa-
tion. Hume’s comments nonetheless do leave us in an 
uncomfortable position, because we do tend to look 
for explanations that make the phenomena intelligible 
to reason. We are prone to relapse, to think that after 
all we must be able to find intelligibility in the world. 
This tendency survives, I suspect, in the idea of ‘levels 
of explanation’. The idea is that within certain levels 
of explanation, we will find a particular kind of intel-
ligibility. [T]he lesson from Hume is that there is no 
more to causation than arbitrary connections between 
independent variables of cause and effect. We have to 
resist the demand for intelligibility [Ref. (2): p. 201].
This is not just a restatement of Murphy’s claim that, in psy-
chiatry, explanations may cross levels. Rather, the very idea of 
levels of explanation, understood as causation operating under 
some constraint of intelligibility, is itself undercut. This applies 
to both ontological and epistemic versions as both assume that 
causation is governed by a priori constraints, whether degree of 
abstraction or composition.
This leaves, however, the issue of shedding some light on the 
nature of causal connections (if not a priori light on particular 
causal connections). In (non-mental) cases of causation, the 
notion of mechanism plays a central role in empirical research. 
Searching out the way in which causal influence is transmitted 
has been an important part of scientific practice. “It would seem 
a kind of madness if someone were to acknowledge that there 
is a causal link, but propose that there may be no mechanism 
linking the two” [Ref. (3): p. 138]. But if science has usefully 
explored the mechanisms that mediate causal influence, there 
must be some paradigmatic mechanisms that stand in need of no 
further explanation and the transmission of motion by impulse, 
in Hume’s billiard ball example, is one such prototype.
Nevertheless, the idea that there must be such a mechanism is a 
kind of synthetic a priori claim which, Campbell suggests, should be 
rejected in line with Hume’s argument. He adopts the interventionist 
model defended most extensively by James Woodward in Making 
Things Happen according to which for X to be a cause of Y is for 
intervening on X to be away of intervening on Y (10). The rejection 
of the necessity of a mechanism and the adoption of an interven-
tionist approach opens up the possibility of a causal connection – in 
accord with interventionism – where there is no mechanism. In the 
case of psychiatry, however, the key issue is causation in the absence 
of a mental mechanism, whatever that is taken to be.
Just as we find it natural to expect there to be a mechanism 
underpinning material causal connections – even if this assump-
tion lacks any genuine a priori justification – so Campbell also 
suggests that in the case of mental causation we expect there to 
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be a rational connection between propositional attitudes. The 
rational link between two propositional attitudes is our paradigm 
of a mental causal mechanism. So, if one hears someone explain 
that they believe that Tranmere Rovers won their most recent 
football match because they heard it on the BBC, which they 
take to be trustworthy, no further inquiry is needed as to why 
the beliefs about what they hear and trust cause the belief about 
the result. Again, however, while the idea that mental causation is 
underpinned by rational connections is natural and compelling, 
it lacks a priori justification.
[T]here is an analogy between:
1 the idea that propositional attitude ascriptions 
depend on the ascription of rationality to the sub-
ject, and
2 the idea that all causal interactions between pieces 
of matter must be comprehensible in mechanistic 
terms.
Both ideas express an insight – that we find it extremely 
puzzling when we encounter causal relations among 
propositional attitudes that are not broadly rational, 
just as we find it extremely puzzling when we encounter 
causal interactions between physical objects that are 
not mechanistic, and that involve spooky ‘action-at-
a-distance’. Both ideas express a natural impulse of 
philosophers – to elevate this kind of point into a kind 
of synthetic a priori demand that reason makes on the 
world. This impulse has to be resisted [Ref. (3): p. 142].
In both cases, there is a genuine insight. As a matter of custom 
and habit, we find an absence of material mechanisms and an 
absence of rational connections between mental states puzzling. 
But in both cases, it is a characteristic philosophical error to pro-
mote this natural expectation into a justified a priori claim that 
the world must respect. Mere custom and habit cannot rationally 
sustain any such demand on how the world must be.
The rejection of the necessity for rational connections between 
causally related mental states looks to ease a central problem for 
the philosophy of psychiatry: explaining delusions. There need be 
nothing genuinely mysterious about a causal connection, which 
lacks a rational connection (the expected mental mechanism).
Suppose you believe:
1 that this man is stroking his chin, and
2 that this man believes you need to shave.
What is it for the first belief to be a cause of the second? 
On the interventionist analysis, it is for the interven-
tion on the first belief to be a way of changing whether 
you have the second belief. So if some external force 
changed your belief that this man is stroking his chin, 
you would no longer believe that he believes you need to 
shave. There is no appeal to rationality here, no appeals 
to mechanism [Ref. (3): p. 143].
The causal connection between one state and another is 
underpinned in interventionist terms based on the idea that if 
intervening on the first belief is a stable way of bringing about a 
change in the second then this is sufficient for there to be a causal 
connection between them.
Spelling this idea out involves a little more complexity, 
however. Given a scanner capable of yielding a complete 
microphysical description of the human body and a longitudi-
nal study of schizophrenia in a population, Campbell suggests 
that it might be possible to form a disjunctive characterization 
of the set of microphysical states that are nomically sufficient 
for schizophrenia. But that function from physical states to 
illness would lack any concise expression and would not be 
couched in terms of variables, which could be affected by 
local intervention. This point reflects the pragmatic aspect to 
interventionism: not every nomically sufficient state counts as 
a cause.
For propositional attitudes to count as causes of delusions, 
Campbell suggests two conditions have to be met. There should 
be “systematic relations between cause variables and the sub-
sequent delusion” and there should be a correlation between a 
change of the cause and a change of the effect [Ref. (3): p. 146]. 
More generally for the causal explanation of mental states, the 
causal variables, which he calls “control variables,” should have 
large, specific, and systematic correlations with their effects akin 
to the way the controls of a car systematically control its behavior. 
These conditions do not require a rational connection, however. 
To repeat Campbell’s phrase, there need be “no appeal to rational-
ity here.”
The classical philosophical approach has been to regard 
propositional attitudes as part of a ‘conceptual scheme’ 
that we bring to bear in describing the ordinary world. 
This conceptual scheme is taken to have strong a priori 
constraints on its applicability. In particular, as we 
have seen, rationality is taken to be a norm with which 
the scheme has to comply. The appeal I have just been 
making to the notion of a control variable is intended 
to replace this invocation of rationality. [I]t is the fact 
that we have control variables, not the fact that we 
have rationality, which means that we are ‘at the right 
level’ to talk of beliefs and desires [Ref. (3): p. 147].
The phrase “at the right level” occurs in inverted commas to 
flag the fact that the notion of the right explanatory level has been 
undercut. Without a pre-Humean insistence on the intelligibility 
of causal relations, there is no more to the notion of being at the 
right level than that there is a causal relation tracked through the 
idea of control variables.
With the idea of control variables replacing an a priori require-
ment for rationality in mental causation, psychiatric explanation 
of delusions is in principle in the same predicament as the expla-
nation of any other belief. Causal explanation has been achieved 
once one has an understanding of the variables necessary for 
changing the delusional belief entertained. The apparently prin-
cipled problem of attempting to fit primary delusions into some 
sort of rational framework is replaced by a practical problem 
of charting the variables that affect them. But is that minimal 
approach enough for psychiatric explanation?
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WittGenstein on CaUsation and 
MeCHanisM
Campbell suggests a mutually supportive analogy between the 
denial that mental causation requires rational mediation and 
that physical causation requires a mechanism. The latter denial 
echoes some remarks by Wittgenstein in Zettel. In this section, I 
will outline the context of Wittgenstein’s discussion, outline a key 
disanalogy and hence begin to suggest a reason to reject explana-
tory minimalism in psychiatry.
The later Wittgenstein makes a number of comments both 
explicitly and implicitly on the connection between mind and 
body. Throughout his various discussions of propositional 
attitudes, he denies the possibility of an explanation of meaning 
or forming an intentional mental state via an appeal to brain 
states. This accords with his criticisms of causal and dispositional 
explanations of rule following in the Philosophical Investigations 
(11). As the discussions of both real and ideal machines imply, the 
attempt to explain rules by appeal to mechanisms is either ques-
tion begging or fails to sustain their normativity [ibid §§193–4]. 
Thus, no account could be given in which thought processes 
might be read off from brain processes.
Such considerations might be thought to motivate the follow-
ing claim in Zettel:
No supposition seems to me more natural than that 
there is no process in the brain correlated with associ-
ating or with thinking; so that it would be impossible 
to read off thought-processes from brain-processes. I 
mean this: if I talk or write there is, I assume, a system of 
impulses going out from my brain and correlated with 
my spoken or written thoughts. But why should the 
system continue further in the direction of the centre? 
Why should this order not proceed, so to speak, out of 
chaos? [Ref. (5): §608]
It is thus perfectly possible that certain psychological 
phenomena cannot be investigated physiologically, 
because physiologically nothing corresponds to them 
[ibid: §609].
These passages could be interpreted as merely denying that the 
systematicity of thought can be explained as resulting from an 
underlying systematicity in the brain. In other words, they could 
be interpreted as a denial of reductionist explanations of meaning 
and mental content.
This interpretation would also be consistent with another 
passage:
Imagine the following phenomenon. If I want someone 
to take note of a text that I recite to him, so that he 
can repeat it to me later, I have to give him paper and 
pencil; while I am speaking he makes lines, marks, on 
the paper; if he has to reproduce the text later he fol-
lows those marks with his eyes and recites the text. But 
I assume that what he has jotted down is not writing, it 
is not connected by rules with the words of the text; yet 
without those jottings he is unable to reproduce the text; 
and if anything in it is altered, if part of it is destroyed, 
he sticks in his ‘reading’ or recites the text uncertainly 
or carelessly, or cannot find the words at all. – This can 
be imagined! – What I called jottings would not be a 
rendering of the text, not so to speak a translation with 
another symbolism. The text would not be stored up 
in the jottings. And why should it be stored up in our 
nervous system? [ibid: §612]
This passage does not say that the marks on paper do not form 
a system. It is just that they do not form a system of the same sort 
as writing. That is why they are not a rendering of the text. They 
are not connected by rules to words. But in that case, what is their 
connection to the text supposed to be? Given that this is supposed 
to be an analogy for the connection between the nervous system 
and our linguistic abilities, one suggestion is that the marks are 
connected to written or spoken words causally rather than via 
shared meaning. If this were the case, while the internal system 
could not be used to reduce mental content, it could still play a 
necessary causal role.
But in fact, Wittgenstein goes further than this. He suggests 
that there need be no cause of a memory in the nervous system. 
Nothing need be stored “up there” in any form. There need be 
no physiological regularity or order causing psychological order. 
Mental order could proceed out of chaos:
The case would be like the following – certain kinds of 
plants multiply by seed, so that a seed always produces 
a plant of the same kind as that from which it was 
produced – but nothing in the seed corresponds to the 
plant which comes from it; so that it is impossible to 
infer the properties or structure of the plant from those 
of the seed that it comes out of – this can only be done 
from the history of the seed. So an organism might come 
into being even out of something quite amorphous, as it 
were causelessly; and there is no reason why this should 
not really hold for our thoughts, and hence for our talk-
ing and writing [ibid: §608].
I saw this man years ago: now I have seen him again, 
I recognise him, I remember his name. And why does 
there have to be a cause of this remembering in my 
nervous system? Why must something or other, what-
ever it may be, be stored up there in any form? Why must 
a trace have been left behind? Why should there not 
be a psychological regularity to which no physiologi-
cal regularity corresponds? If this upsets our concepts 
of causality then it is high time they were upset [ibid: 
§610].
These two passages are pitched against a model of levels of 
explanation in which a psychological regularity corresponds to 
a regularity at a lower level. That is, they run counter to the 
assumption in both Putnam and Oppenheim’s ontological, 
but also Marr’s epistemological, accounts of the constraints 
operating between levels of explanation. By contrast with 
Campbell, Wittgenstein does not reject the idea that there is 
a characteristic level of explanation for mental happenings. 
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Using terminology not in widespread use when Wittgenstein 
wrote these remarks, they amount to the claim that plants’ 
development do not supervene on their seeds’ microstructure. 
Given contemporary understanding of RNA, this might seem 
a bizarre possibility. But the denial is of a modal claim: that the 
plant must be determined by something in the seed’s structure. 
Wittgenstein denies this assumption, natural though it cur-
rently seems.
Like Campbell, Wittgenstein denies that the psychological regu-
larity has to be mediated by one at the neurological or physical level. 
Furthermore, like Campbell, he suggests an analogical denial. What 
we might have taken to be a causal physical connection – in the seed 
and tree example – also need not be mediated by any mechanism. 
(The analogy is with psychological regularity depending on the 
physical level.) There is a difference between Wittgenstein and 
Campbell, however, in that Wittgenstein here assumes the very 
connection between causation and mechanism that Campbell 
denies in favor of interventionism. Wittgenstein asks:
Why should there not be a natural law connecting a 
starting and a finishing state of a system, but not cover-
ing the intermediary state? (Only one must not think of 
causal efficacy.) [ibid: §613]
This passage assumes that the denial of an intervening mecha-
nism implies a denial of causal efficacy. Given that the natural 
law would sustain the kind of intervention conditionals, then a 
particular kind of seed producing a particular kind of plant would 
count as a causal connection according to Campbell. But this 
looks merely like a difference of terminology. Both Campbell and 
Wittgenstein can grant a law-like connection. Campbell’s account 
suggests it should count as “causal” while Wittgenstein denies it 
“causal efficacy.” Both deny that there need be an intermediate 
mechanism. But aside from its causal status, the metaphysical 
facts are agreed.
Despite that, however, there is a fundamental difference. 
Wittgenstein’s remarks are aimed at removing the tension of 
reconciling a connection made at the mental level in mental 
and, according to him, non-causal terms with assumptions 
about underlying causal mechanisms at a physiological level. 
Campbell’s, by contrast, suggest that transitions at the mental 
level can, when explanatory, be causal. I will now explore the 
significance of this difference.
tHe roLe oF an appeaL to 
rationaLity in WittGenstein’s 
disCUssion oF intentionaLity
In order to see the difference between Campbell and Wittgenstein, 
it will be helpful to start with what they share. There are two par-
ticularly clear examples in the Philosophical Investigations where 
Wittgenstein, like Campbell, rejects an appeal to underlying 
mechanisms to explain a connection at the mental level. But, by 
contrast with Campbell, he goes on to suggest a different account 
of the mental connection. It is this that suggests Wittgenstein’s 
commitment to a characteristically mental level of explanation.
One example concerns the ability to read out loud, of what 
reading comprises. He considers the temptation to identify the 
ability with a mechanism through the example of a comparison 
between an expert reader and a beginner who can only read 
words by laboriously spelling them out.
Now we would, of course, like to say: What goes on in 
the practised reader and in the beginner when they utter 
the word can’t be the same. And if there is no difference 
in what they are currently conscious of, there must be 
one in the unconscious workings of their minds, or, 
again, in the brain. – So we’d like to say: There are, at 
any rate, two different mechanisms here! And what 
goes on in them must distinguish reading from not 
reading. – But these mechanisms are only hypotheses, 
models to explain, to sum up, what you observe [Ref. 
(11): p. §156].
Rejecting the hypothetical mechanism – whether an uncon-
scious mental mechanism or physiological one – as well as con-
scious experiences of being guided or feelings of familiarity, he 
stresses instead the relation between the text and spoken words, 
however, mediated. Whatever mediating processes there may be 
are not what is meant by “reading.”
A second example concerns the intentional directedness of 
having someone in mind.
“I am thinking of N.” “I am speaking of N.”
How do I speak of him? I say, for instance, “I must go 
and see N. today” – But surely that is not enough! After 
all, when I say “N.”, I might mean various people of 
this name. – “Then there must surely be a further link 
between my words and N., for otherwise I would still 
not have meant him.” Certainly such a link exists. Only 
not as you imagine it: namely, by means of a mental 
mechanism [ibid: §689].
In the surrounding discussion, various putative explanatory 
connections are considered and rejected including the idea that no 
such connection exists, that it is created in being verbally avowed 
(and that both are true!), and that it is connected to what would, 
counter-factually, have been reported. Wittgenstein’s discussion 
fits a meta-philosophical injunction: “The point is not to explain 
a language-game by means of our experiences, but to take account 
of a language-game” [ibid: §655]. But it also accords with a brief 
assertion in the middle of an earlier discussion of the intentional 
directedness of propositional attitudes: “It is in language that an 
expectation and its fulfilment make contact” [ibid: §445].
This terse comment picks up the idea that avowals and descrip-
tions of expectations and other propositional attitudes reuse the 
same fragments of language as descriptions of the events that 
would satisfy them (12). To be able to form such a propositional 
attitude requires the contingent ability to fit one’s avowals and 
actions into the rational pattern articulated in language. The criti-
cism of underlying mechanisms is made against the background 
account that psychological order has a rational linguistically 
mediated structure.
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This suggests a fundamental contrast with Campbell’s view. 
Although both Campbell and Wittgenstein reject mechanisms, 
Wittgenstein’s rejection goes hand in hand with a normative and 
rationalistic view at the mental level which Campbell, at least 
in the series of papers so far discussed, downplays. In the final 
section, I will outline the consequences of this disagreement for 
causal explanation in psychiatry. But first I will briefly summarize 
how Wittgenstein’s views of meaning and mental content suggest 
a picture of levels of explanation.
a WittGensteinian VieW oF LeVeLs 
oF eXpLanation
I began by outlining the two dominant approaches to thinking 
about levels of explanation, both ontological and epistemic. Both 
approaches not only suggest ways of distinguishing levels but both 
also suggest constraining relations of either composition, in the 
ontological case, or realization, in the epistemological approach. 
Wittgenstein’s discussion of mental phenomena in, especially, his 
Philosophical Investigations sets out some of the key differences 
between normative meaning-related or intentional connections 
and causal connections. But his remarks in Zettel run counter to the 
assumptions, particularly in Putnam and Oppenheim, of the con-
straining relations between the psychological and the neurological.
In other words, Wittgenstein’s remarks suggest a middle ground 
between Campbell, on the one hand, and Putnam and Oppenheim, 
on the other hand. Thinking that there are distinct forms of intel-
ligibility need not imply an a priori view of a constraining relation 
between them. Putnam and Oppenheim assume a series of levels of 
explanation but then impose a reductionist view of their relations. 
Campbell rejects the intelligibility of levels of explanation in the first 
place. Wittgenstein, however, suggests that grasping events or states 
as mental phenomena presupposes fitting them into a normative and 
rational linguistic structure but denies that this necessitates connec-
tions to a non-normative pattern of causal relations. This suggests that 
to understand a state to be a state of expectation, for example, involves 
relating it in a characteristic way to events that would satisfy or fulfill it 
and hence to presuppose a particular a priori pattern of intelligibility. 
But Wittgenstein denies the need, a priori at least, to connect this to 
any underlying pattern of neurological cause and effect.
The denial of an a  priori connection to underlying neurol-
ogy is not the same as denying an a posteriori connection. The 
remarks in Zettel do not contradict the possibility of neurological 
and psychiatric research establishing local connections between 
medical interventions and psychological effects. Instead, they 
caution merely against assuming that a pattern at one level must 
be relatable to a pattern at a lower level.
inFLatinG eXpLanatory MiniMaLisM 
in psyCHiatry
Earlier I reported Campbell’s claim that:
[I]t is the fact that we have control variables, not the fact 
that we have rationality, which means that we are ‘at the 
right level’ to talk of beliefs and desires [Ref. (3): p. 147].
I asked whether the resulting picture of explanatory minimal-
ism was sufficient for psychiatric explanation. It is not sufficient 
because it provides no account of what constitutes a state as 
a belief, or a desire or even a delusion. In the absence of that, 
however, psychiatric explanation would miss a key feature of the 
phenomena it aims to illuminate.
In an earlier paper, Campbell himself endorses the role of 
rationality as a presupposition for holding propositional attitudes. 
He suggests two general reasons for this. The less important one 
is as follows.
One simple reason for thinking that rationality is 
critical here is that unless you assume the other person 
is rational, it does not seem possible to say what the 
significance is of ascribing any particular propositional 
state to the subject. If you tell me that someone rational 
thinks that it is raining, then given that the person is 
rational and does not want to get wet, I know what kinds 
of behavior to expect. If, however, the person is not at all 
rational, then saying they have the belief has no implica-
tions at all for how they will behave [Ref. (13): p. 89].
Campbell’s focus is on the ascription of propositional attitudes 
to others. The imputation of rationality goes hand-in-hand with 
an ascription of propositional attitudes. The argument in the pas-
sage seems to concern what follows from the ascription. Without 
the assumption that the subject is also rational, it is not clear what 
can be inferred from the ascription of particular mental states to 
them. But this argument surely broadens. Without a rational pat-
tern, the very idea that the subject has some determinate mental 
state is undermined (14–16).
There is a second connection, however, which Campbell 
thinks is the more important. It concerns the connection between 
rationality, belief, and meaning. Understanding others’ utterances 
and hence ascribing beliefs to them is only possible against a 
background assumption of rationality. There is a balance between 
possible irrationality and the ascription of meaning.
The finding of irrationality can always be traded for a 
finding of mistranslation. And we should always trans-
late so as to find the subject rational in the use of a term 
by the lights of the subject’s own understanding of the 
term [ibid: 90].
This sketch of the connection between interpretation and the 
ascription of belief echoes Wittgenstein’s suggestion of a linguistic 
mediation of mental states and their intentional objects. The very 
idea of having propositional attitudes presupposes a harmony 
between the meaning of utterances, the mental states held, and 
the pattern of actions they rationalize.
Thus, the claim that control variables, rather than rational-
ity, constitutes the “right level” to talk of beliefs and desires 
fails to address a prior constitutive question. What is it about 
some particular causes and effects, described using the 
interventionist model of causation, which constitutes them 
as intentional mental states in the first place? Given its broad 
application to causation in the non-mental as well as mental 
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world, talk of control variables alone is insufficient to address 
this question. But introducing issues of language, interpreta-
tion, and rationality suggests that there is a particular level 
of explanation which is of central importance to psychiatry 
when it addresses the meaning and content of psychological 
phenomena.
In the example described above, Campbell argues that for the 
belief that this man is stroking his chin to cause the belief that 
this man believes you need to shave all that is needed is a suitable 
interventionist counterfactual relation rather than an appeal to 
rationality. But without some further background conditions, 
of which rationality is one plausible candidate, the ascription of 
determinate mental states is illicit.
It may seem, however, that defending the role of a rational 
connection between utterance, mental state, and behavior is par-
ticularly difficult in the case of psychiatric explanation. After all, 
psychiatry investigates phenomena that appear to resist rational 
understanding. While this is true and puzzling, however, it does 
not threaten the connection itself.
Consider Campbell’s discussion of Capgras in the earlier 
paper (13). He uses the link between meaning and rationality 
to suggest a problem with the interpretation of characteristic 
expressions of the delusion. The characteristic type of utterance 
associated with the delusion is: “That woman is not my wife!.” 
But that sentence might be used to make a number of differ-
ent claims. It might, for example, be used to flag the discovery 
of illegality in a past wedding ceremony. The most plausible 
interpretation in the context of the expression of the Capgras 
delusion is something like: This [demonstrated] woman is not 
that [remembered] woman. But such an interpretation is put 
under strain because, typically, the subject of the delusion does 
not attempt to carry out any of the paradigmatic or canonical 
forms of checking appropriate for such a claim: for example, 
discussing past events and checking memories. They do not do 
what they ought to do to check such a thought. Given the link 
between meaning, mental content, and rationality, this apparent 
failure of rationality undermines such an interpretation.
Campbell himself goes on to try a partial accommodation of 
the delusion within rational space by suggesting it might be a 
deviant hinge or framework proposition since, if it were, it would 
be rational not to subject it to testing. It is unclear whether this 
approach can work as it is unclear what understanding there can 
be of a framework proposition which is not shared (17). But the 
difficulties Campbell highlights seem genuine. Does a subject 
who makes a paradigmatic Capgras utterance but does nothing 
else different really believe that their partner is an imposter? 
Likewise, does the Cotard utterance “I am dead” really express 
the impossible belief that the subject is dead? The difficulty seems 
fundamental to such cases.
In a more recent paper, Campbell seems more pessimistic 
about fitting delusions into any sort of rational pattern. He con-
siders a delusion in which the subject thinks that her mother’s 
thoughts were inserted into her mind via raindrops and the air 
conditioner. He points out that the structure of this delusion 
could not be used to teach what is meant by “rationality.” But 
further:
The trouble is not even that the patient is not rational. 
We have no idea what a rational way of going on 
would be, once one has accepted that thoughts are 
being inserted into one’s mind. How must the world 
be, for that to happen? Would it make sense to argue 
with this patient that, by her own lights, it is not 
the raindrops in the air conditioning that should be 
blamed, but rather the electrical sockets all around? 
We have departed so far from the ordinary world that 
we have no idea what stands fast and what has to go 
[Ref. (3): p. 141].
Again, these seem to be genuine and substantial difficulties in 
working out what the subject actually thinks. But Campbell offers 
a particular interpretation of the difficulty. He says:
We should not appeal to the idea that there are a priori 
constraints on causal relations among propositional 
attitudes. We have to accept that the propositional atti-
tudes are one thing and the causal relations among them 
are another. If propositional attitudes do not conform to 
rationality, that is puzzling. But we cannot legislate in 
advance that this cannot happen [ibid: 140].
This seems an unjustified response, however. The problem is 
not merely that there are contingent breakdowns in the expected 
rational connections between identifiable propositional attitudes. 
Rather, in the case of delusion, the nature of the supposed propo-
sitional attitudes themselves is, and continues to be, puzzling. 
Hence, for example, attempts to suggest that the delusion may 
be a propositional attitude of imagination rather than belief 
[e.g., Ref. (18)]. It is not that the bizarre quality of delusions 
threatens the general connection between meaning, mental state, 
and rationality but instead that the general connection helps to 
illuminate what is so puzzling about delusion. The connection 
to rationality is not arbitrary: it helps justify the claim that a 
state is a mental state or that an utterance expresses a particular 
propositional attitude.
ConCLUsion
Given the heterogeneity of the factors that feature in explanations 
in psychiatry, it is tempting to assume that, in principle, they can 
be related within an ordered hierarchy of levels of explanation. 
There is reason, however, to doubt that this picture fits contem-
porary psychiatry. But that leaves open the response that that is a 
reflection merely on the current state of psychiatric research and 
that a completed psychiatry would form an ordered hierarchy.
More radically, John Campbell has argued in recent papers 
that the very idea of levels of explanation presupposes a discred-
ited pre-Humean view of causation. He claims that although the 
assumption that physical causation is mediated by mechanisms 
and that psychological causation is mediated by rational relations 
have both been fruitful neither need to be true. With their rejec-
tion as synthetic a priori claims about the world, the idea of levels 
of explanation also falls away to leave an explanatory minimalism.
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Comparing Campbell’s remarks with some superficially 
similar remarks in Wittgenstein’s Zettel suggests an objection to 
explanatory minimalism. The very idea of a state being a mental 
state presupposes broader connections. Rationality is one such 
candidate. If so, explanation in psychiatry inflates from Campbell’s 
minimalism and introduces an appropriate level of explanation at 
which mentality comes into view. But it is possible to hold on to 
the necessity of such general levels of explanation while rejecting 
a  priori claims about how different levels of explanation must 
relate to each other.
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